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but this is limited to things which at the time have no owner,
res nullius. A thing which is susceptible of ownership may hap-
pen to be without an owner either by reason of the fact that it
has not yet had any owner (wild life and game), or because its
former owner has abandoned it.'5 In the latter situation, a claim
of occupancy must be predicated on a preliminary proof of aban-
donment, which is not a matter to be taken lightly. Thus in Don-
nell v. Gray14 a landowner was denied the ownership of certain
oil well equipment merely because it had been left on his proper-
ty for a considerable time after operations were finished. The
owner's silence and failure to remove the equipment after a
notice to vacate do not constitute an abandonment. In fact, the
original owner could not have had any intention of giving it up
because he later sold the equipment to the plaintiff in the present
suit who was trying to get it from the resisting defendant. Judg-
ment was rendered in favor of plaintiff.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
Acquirendi causa
For the ten-year acquisitive prescription in good faith and
with just title, the Civil Code provides that the entry on a part
of the estate establishes possession of the whole property as de-
scribed in the deed.' Where the property involved is one single
tract of land, properly described, the application of this princi-
ple is clear and simple. In the case of Haas v. Dezauche2 the facts
presented a variation of the problem, because in the one deed
there were included several separate tracts of land which were
contiguous but individually described. Entry had been satisfac-
torily established' on part but not all of this land; there was no
showing of actual possession over the area in dispute. The court
sustained the acquisitive prescription for the whole property on
the ground that, despite the separate descriptions of the respec-
13. Art. 3421, La. Civil Code of 1870.
14. 41 So.(2d) 66 (La. 1949).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art 3437, La. Civil Code of 1870: "It is not necessary, however, that a
person wishing to take possession of an estate should pass over every part
of it; it is sufficient if he enters on and occupies a part of the land, provided it
be with the intention of possessing all that is included within the boundaries."
2. 214 La. 259, 37 So.(2d) 441 (1948).
3. This possession was shown by the cutting and removing timber from
swamp lands, on the authority of Veltin v. Haas, 207 La. 650, 21 So.(2d) 862
(1945). See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1944-1945 Term
(1946) 6 LOUiSuANA LAW R VIsw 521, 580.
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tive units, the entire tract of land formed a single estate in the
deed and in the intention of the parties. Consequently the pos-
sessor was entitled to the presumption in Article 34984 so that the
actual possession of part constituted a full possession of the
whole and extended to the limits described in the deed.
Possession-Adverse or Precarious
It is one of the well established principles of acquisitive pre-
scription that the claimant's possession must be as owner5 so
that an actual possession which acknowledges any other owner is
precarious 6 and is no possession at all for purposes of prescription.
However, the application to actual facts is still troublesome. Thus,
in Frost Lumber Industries v. Harrison7 the district court's judg-
ment was reversed by the court of appeal,8 whose judgment was
in turn reversed by the supreme court. Mariah Harrison was the
widow in possession of the community property, as owner of one-
half and as usufructuary of the other undivided one-half. She
sold her undivided one-half in 1913, but neither her vendee nor
the subsequent transferees asked for a partition and possession
until the present suit was instituted in 1946. Mariah Harrison
continued to live on, the whole property and then claimed the
reacquisition of that undivided one-half interest by the thirty-
year prescription. While there is no need to have good faith or
just title for this thirty-year prescription, it is necessary to have
legal possession.9 This, the court held, she did not have because
the facts showed that Mariah Harrison had continued on the land
by the sufferance of her vendee, and this made her possession
a "precarious" one ag to that one-half interest (while she con-
tinued as usufructuary of the other one-half owned by her chil-
dren). It is possible for a precarious possession to be converted
into an adverse legal possession which could start a prescription.
However, this cannot be done "without some overt act or notice
by which her vendee could become apprised of the change in her
quality as a precarious possessor."10 In the facts of the present
4. Art. 3498, La. Civil Code of 1870: "When a person has a title and pos-
session conformably to it, he is presumed to possess according to the title and
to the full extent of its limits." See Leader Realty Co. v. Taylor, 147 La. 256,
265, 84 So. 648, 651 (1920).
5. Arts. 3436, 3487, La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. Arts. 3441, 3489, 3490, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. 41 So.(2d) 674 (La. 1949).
8. 35 So.(2d) 832 (La. App. 1948). The court of appeal considered that the
facts entitled claimant to the benefit of the presumption in Article 3488 that
a possession is presumed to be as owner.
9. Art. 3500, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. 41 So.(2d) 674, 676 (La. 1949).
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case, the court did not find this necessary element of any out-
ward sign or affirmative act which would have served as notice
of terminating the precarious possession and of starting a new
adverse possession as owner.
SALE
Joseph Dainow*
Property Description
In the case of Williams v. Bowie Lumber Company1 the plain-
tiffs were descendants of one Martin who had conveyed to one
Dowman "all the property owned by him in the Parish of La-
fourche" (except certain described units), and they now claim
ownership on the basis of inadequate description of the property.
Since heirs are included within the term "parties," it was held
that they could not attack the conveyance of their ancestor, be-
cause an omnibus description is binding between the parties.
Other cases which had held conveyances invalid for lack of ade-
quate description were distinguished as involving the rights of
third persons. If Martin would have made a subsequent sale of
the same property to a third person, with full description and
proper recordation, the claim of such person might have come
into the latter category, but that is not what the court had to
consider in the present case.
Merchantable title
Three cases reiterated the rule that a vendor does not have
a right of action for specific performance or for damages against
a vendee who refuses to accept a tendered title if this title is
suggestive of serious litigation.
In the case of Schaub v. O'Quin,2 the title which plaintiff was
offering had been obtained at the private sale of a minor's im-
movable property, for which the tutor had obtained the under-
tutor's concurring affidavit instead of ruling him into court as
required by Act 209 of 1932.3 In the case at bar, the validity of
this title was not in issue and the court could not pass upon it,
but until there was an adjudication as to compliance or substan-
tial compliance there remained the direct possibility of such a
law suit. The title was therefore "suggestive of serious future lit-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 214 La. 750, 38 So.(2d) 729 (1948).
2. 214 La. 424, 38 So. (2d) 63 (1948), noted in (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REvIEW 563.
3. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4844-4847.5.
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